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IntrodiK'lion
In South Africa the levels of unemployment and poverty are extremely high and 
unemployment is one of South Africa’s most pressing problems According to the 
Federation of Unions of South Africa (Sowetan, 1999) acceptable levels of social 
development, economic growth and a decrease in high crime levels will only be achieved 
if the 35 per cent unemployment is decreased dramatically The high unemployment rate 
will undermine the democracy if it is not reduced At the same time there is a great need 
for physical infrastructure in both urban and rural areas According to the World Bank 
(1994 2) infrastructure can deliver major benefits in economic growth, poverty
alleviation, and environmental sustainability - but only when it provides services that 
respond to effective demand and does so efficiently In addition there is a lack of capacity 
and skills at institutional, community and individual levels From a theoretical 
perspective supported by experience elsewhere in Africa, there are reasons for 
considering that properly formulated employment creation programmes based on the use 
of employment-intensive methods could be established to construct and maintain the 
required physical infrastructure, thus creating employment, skills and institutional 
capacities
I'rior to the 1994 election the African National Congress’s (ANC) proposed the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was a result of several years of 
careful deliberation and widespread participation One of the main thrusts of the RDP 
was to link reconstruction and development through an “infrastructural programme”, fhe 
key area where special measures to create jobs could link to building the economy and 
meeting basic needs would be redressing apartheid-created infrastructural disparities It 
was stated that there “must be a co-ordinated national public works programme to 
provide much needed infrastructure ” One of the qualifying statements read “co-ordinate 
with and link to other job creation and labour-intensive construction initiatives 
.Since the early 1980s many large scale projects and programmes related to infrastructure 
development \ employment creation were carried out Billions of Rands had been spent in 
such projects and programmesFlowever these projects \ programmes have been poorly
I'osl CiiadiHlc siiidcnl in the Ocparliiicnl of Civil Fiipmccring 
Piotcssor and Head ot Dcparlincnl in llie Deparlnicnl of Civil Hngiiiecring
documented and evaluated Where documentation does exist severe shortcomings have 
been identilied After it came to power, the Government of National Unity initiated 
several large piojects and programmes, under the National Public Works Programme 
(NPWP) Ihe.se are collectively known as the (’ommunity Based Public Works 
Progratnme (CBPWP) Several programmes and projects fall under tbe CBPWP The 
paper will critically evaluate large-scale development projects which were initiated by the 
Nationalist (iovernment The paper will concentrate on the Soweto Upgrading Project as 
a case study Have the projects and programmes since IW4 been better documented and 
evaluated''
Given the socio-economic conditions and political objectives (regarding 
development, employment creation and alleviation of poverty) it is anticipated that future 
large scale projects and programmes will be proposed by the public sector (National, 
Provincial and Local Government) What are the lessons that can be learned from past 
experience, both international and South African, to improve such future projects and 
programmes''
According to a review by ILO and CASE in Everatt et al (1997), South Africa 
has probably one of the best Public Works Programmes (PWP) anywhere. Certainly, in 
terms of technical design .standards and the quality of completed physical infrastructure, 
the CBPWP surpasses anything that the International Labour Organization members of 
the team have encountered in more than ,)0 developing countries in Africa, Asia and the 
Pacific Not only this, but the level of professional integrity among most role players in 
the CBPWP is in international terms, outstanding Nevertheless, the CBPWP has its 
share of shoitcomings and problems
The past decades have brought about greater demand for the utilisation of project 
management in the execution of development projects; especially in the public sector 
This has culminated from a realisation that project management is focused on maximising 
efficient and effective use of available resources. This is vital in developing countries 
where resources are often scarce and therefore their maximal and efficient utilisation 
becomes ciiicial Project management aims at providing ways of structuring management 
and adapting special techniques to obtain better control and use of available resources 
The changes in technology, management issues, and market forces have brought about a 
need to have dynamic and flexible management forms Such forms should be able to 
adapt and respond timeously enough to the changing environments
Reconslriirtioii and Development Programme (RDP)
In 1994 the African National Congress produced the final draft of their RDP Later that 
year (after winning the elections), the RDP was redrafted in the form of a White Paper 
and brought before parliament and approved The RDP is a programme that seeks to 
redress the inequities and deprivation caused by the former government's apartheid 
policies One of the main thnists of the RDP White Paper remained “to link 
reconstruction and development: to reduce poverty and create employment through 
programmes of infrastructure construction and maintenance”
The programme is founded on six basic principles, linked together which make up the 
political and economic philosophy that underlies the whole RDP
• the use of all available resources in a coherent and purposeful effort that can be
sustained into the fijture,
• a people driven process,
• peace and security for all;
• nation building;
• reconstruction and development; and
• democratisation of South Africa
■fhese principles are indicative of the strong emphasis the RDP places on community 
participation methods The RDP advocated the linking of an infrastructural programme 
that will provide access to modern and effective services like electricity, water, 
telecommunications, health, education and training for all our people This programme 
will both meet basic needs and open up previously suppressed economic and human 
potential in urban and rural areas
I he key area was special measures to create jobs that can link to building the 
economy and meeting basic needs in redressing apartheid-created infrastructural 
disparities There must be a coordinated national public works programme to provide 
much-needed infrastructure, to repair environmental damage, and to expand and 
contribute to the restructuring of the industrial and agricultural base Such a programme 
must include: the provision of education and training; the involvement of communities in 
the process so that they are empowered to contribute to their own governance, the 
construction of technically sound assets; the maximisation of the involvement of women 
and youth in the poorest rural households and most deprived provinces; coordinate with 
and link to other job creation and labour-intensive construction initiatives, a national 
coordinating agency to ensure that the public works programme is based on the capital 
programmes at national, provincial and local level, give priority to job creation and 
training, target the most marginalised sections of society, and, where possible, encourage 
and support self-employment through small- and medium- enterprise creation to ensure 
sustainability of skills
Problems AITertiiig Large Scale Projects
According to Bastani (1088) the failure of development initiative, where this has 
occuri ed, has been linked to a lack of project success, which in turn has been caused by 
failures in economic policy, project design (and implementation) and a lack of 
institutional capacity International experience with large infrastructure development 
projects has been disappointing (Bastani, 1088) According to Bastani (ibid) what is 
significant is not only that after three decades of involvement in development the experts 
are still unable to determine ‘correct’ and workable policies for development, but rather 
the recognition that even if the initial policy is correctly envisaged, development projects 
and as a result, the development process can fail because of inappropriate design and 
implementation or a lack of institutional capacity on the part of local governments 
entrusted with the task of project implementation
fhe World Bank (Ib84) in its tenth Annual Review of its Project Performance 
Audit results considers institutional failure to be the most fundamental reason for lack of 
project success, with project design and policy failures being named as the other two
major contributing factors It shoiikl be noted that policy failures include sector and 
macro-economic policy decisions by funding institutions as well as by local governments 
agencies (a top-down process) Project design on the other hand includes the 
iderttillcation of specific projects, their detail design and, in the case of capital projects, 
the management and coordination of the construction phase Kalberrnatlen el al (IW2) 
asserts that in many development projects in Developing Countries, the conventional 
approach to infrastructural development adopted from urbanised, western, developed 
couniries was found to be unsuitable because it was overly centralised and did not reflect 
local traditions and the needs for community participation
According to the World Bank (1990) the physical components of programs had 
generally been more successful than the institutional development components The bank 
reviews of past activities have consistently arrived at the conclusion that the physical 
components of programs have been successful about twice as often as have institutional 
development components The difficulties intrittsic to these institutions make success 
even more problematic and highlight the need to improve the effectiveness of 
itistilutional development programs The bank further highlight that although many 
policymakers are aware of the importance of institutions in a development strategy, they 
.still do not give it the necessary priority, in part becau.se they believe that there is no clear 
way of going about it
In addition the World Bank (1990 I I) asserts that in.stitutional development is 
synonymous with institution building and is defined as the process of improving an 
institution's ability to make effective use of the human and financial resources available 
I his process can be internally generated by the managers of an institution or induced and 
promoted by the government or by development agencies.
Based on both the international and local experiences, the problems of recent (1980s) 
South African large-scale public works programmes can be attributed to the following 
factors which must be avoided in order for large-scale projects to be successful in South 
Africa (Abedian and Standish, 1986; UNDP and the 11,0, 1987 and 1989; l.igthelm and 
Kritzingei van Niekerk, 1990, McCutcheon, 1990; 1992 and 1994, and Greyling, 1994)
• l,ack of clear objectives linking the short and long-term visions of the programme
• There were no pilot projects with extensive training programmes or lead in time to 
allow for proper planning al a national scale This could have allowed for sufficient 
time to develop the necessary technology, establish training programmes and develop 
both the institutional and the individual capacities
• The programmes have seldom been scaled to the magnitude of national manpower 
needs Very often they have been introduced in an unsystematic and fragmentary 
style This often led to technical hastiness, which was compounded by incompetence 
and inappropriate technology selection
• fhere have been organisational infirmities and inappropriate administrative 
arrangements
• fhere has been a lack of political and government commitment to the projects and 
programmes.
0
The paper will then look at the Greater Soweto Upgrading project which was initiated by 
the former Nationalist fiovernment in the 1980s
Stated objective To eliminate the backlog of civil engineering services in Greater 
Soweto Area Another intention with the GSUP was development (increasing living 
standards) through infrastructure engineering The project objective (elimination of 
backlog) did however not refer to any socio-political or cultural intentions From the 
objective it is clear that the project focussed on physical infrastructure, and did not 
acknowledge that “development is more than the passage from poor to rich, from a 
traditional rural economy to a sophisticated urban one It carries with it not only the idea 
of economic betterment, but also of greater human dignity, security, justice and equity” 
(The Independent Commission of International Development Issues, 1980)
If at least some of these factors were addressed by the project objective, chances 
are that the project might have gained support from ail kinds of other sources, including 
socio-political, cultural, human rights and economic groups This would have contributed 
to the creation of a sustainable project
Secuiidiiiy objectives:
• To achieve this progrannne as soon as possible
• To promote the welfare of Soweto residents
I he researcher believe that the main objective stated was secondary to the hidden 
agendas pursued by the government 
Hidden agenda
fo upgrade civil engineering services in Soweto as a show-case to overseas countries and 
black South Africans as an illustration of what the government was doing something in 
an etTort to quell violence and unrest
fhe methodology of attempting to do this is also somewhat suspect The otTicial 
leaction to the unrest in the late 1970s was to upgrade services which were not the 
primary cause of the violence in the fust place The political objective was not achieved 
in that the government could not redeem itself in others eyes purely by upgrading civil 
engineering services in one township The needs of the residents were ignored in setting 
up project objectives This had been confirmed by the author through conducting 
interviews with 24 Soweto residents who were present during the 1980s fhe residents 
told the author that rather than tarred roads, extensive kerbing, overdesigned bridges etc , 
the Soweto residetits were in want of
• political freedotn
• equal education
• subsidised tratisport
• property ownership
• upgrading health facilities
• recreation facilities
• political recognition.
From the poitit of view it is clear that the project was completely misguided The only 
objectives that could be tnet was the provision of a high standard of services without any 
t egard for the well-beitig of the residents fhe three local authorities iti Soweto were the
only represenlalives from the comiminity involved in discussion with the project team 
However, the priorities of the local authority is usually dependent on their own political 
goals such as representation The Soweto upgrading was financed by an international 
consortium and the services supplied were related more closely to what the white 
community wanted than the black community needed or determined as a priority for 
themselves
Preparation
Instead of the suggested one to two years a project spends in the pipeline, the bulk of the 
planning was done in the six weeks aljer the (iS fPA AP was formed. It is largely due to 
this time restriction that objectives were not critically analysed, that project briefs were 
vague and that planning was incomplete
Services identified and what wa.s achieved
TAUI.E I A
TOTAI, INFRASTRUCTURE BACKLOG
ROADS, STREETS AND STORMWATER DRAINAGE
Infrastriiclii re Size/
Distance
What was 
Achieved?
Stormwater Drainage 385 km 131 km
Mountable Kerbing (300mm) 427 km 145 km
Four lane Arterial (14,8m 
wide)
9 km 3, 06 km
Arterial Roads (7,4 metres 
wide)
5 km 1, 7 km
Rebuilding of Existing 
Surfaced Roads
34 km 10 km
Resurfacing of Existing Roads 173 km 59 km
( onstmction of Heavy Duty 
Pavement
220 000 
m-
74 800 m"
Inter.sections Upgrading 50 000m- 17 000 m^
Construction of 6 metres wide 
roads
14 km 5 km
Constniclion of 5,5 metres 
wide roads
130 km 44, 2 km
C onstruction of 4.5 metres 
wide roads
380 km 129,2 km
lABLE 1 B
SEWERAGE SERVICES
liifrasiructure Whiit was Achieved?
The Upgrading of the existing 
reticulations where necessary
Some reticulations were upgraded
Extensions to the Btishkoppie 
Sewerage Purifications Works 
Phase 1
The Extensions to Btishkoppie 
Sewerage was not completed 
(completed after 1987)
Construction of the Btishkoppie 
Outfall Sewer Phase 1
it was completed after 1987
Construction of the Relief Sewer 
of the Olifantsviei-Dube Outfall 
Sewer
It was completed
I ABLE I C
WATER SUPPLY AND RETICULATION
l i ih a s t r i ic t u r c S i / c /  D is ta n c e W h a t  w a s A c h ie v e d
B u ild in g  K c s c iA u ir s D o b s o n v ilic
C’h ia w cio
D ie p k io o f
M e a d o w la n d s
C o m p le te d  
Not C o m p le te d  
Not C o m p le te d  
Not C om pleted
A tig m c iu a h o n  o f (he p n iiia r)  
d is lrt b iil io ii sv s lc in
Not com pleted
U p g ra d in g  sc c o n d a n  r e l ia ila l io n  
replace .il l  in in  p ipes b y e ill ic r  
"<111111 or KK) m m  pipes
25%  o f the upg rad in g  w as done
li is la l la l io i i  o l w ater m elers 20 o f  (he W'aters meters were 
in sta lle d
K e p a ir  a ll le a k in g  tapes and 
I'lUmgs
T h is  w as not done
Source: Trissler (1997); Viljoeii, P.S. 1988
file World Bank ( l ‘)9() IS) slates that evaluation is hampered by a poor delinilion of 
objectives and by the lack of baseline data and accepted methodologies for undertaking 
these evaluations It is questionable whether the Upgrading project should have been 
undertaken at all What was needed at the time was extensive political change designed to 
alford the black population their rightful position in society Political change occurred a 
decade later but this in itself seems to have aggravated township violence It is therefore 
imperative that political change and upgrading of living conditions go hand in hand to 
approach on acceptable solution From the civil engineering and planning perspective, the 
following objectives should have been set to ensure success of the Upgrading Project
To make Soweto acceptable to its inhabitants
fhe majoritv of black township dwellers are dissatisfied with their existing standard of 
living fhis is not surprising as the complexity of class cleavages and racial division in 
South Africa bedevils many a theoretical explanation Dissatisfaction also more acute in 
established residenis than in recent immigrants who probably increased their living 
standard by moving from rural areas into Soweto
Acceptance of the township by its residenis would have had the effects of
i producing a more stable community with increased home ownership’ 
initiation of local development projects by residenis,
ii increased willingness to pay rates and taxes and setting up capital investment,
iii reducing crime and civil interest
I'o eiisiii c affordable levels of service to local residents
Appropriate technology
Theory
Urban development in South Africa has to dale reflected Western values in social 
standards ollen without much thought to long-term economic implication The 
appropriateness of the specifications on which a design is based should be evaluated by 
assessing the needs and objectives for the project in question The purely scientific basis 
for Fngineering solutions has to expand to encompass deeper understanding and 
consideration of socio-political circumstances present in the project environment 
Appropriate technology is often seen to be of inferior quality and clients might be loathe 
to accept alternative engineering solutions It should be understood that appropriate 
technology provides the most economically, financially and technically apt solution to a 
problem, without compromising quality; quantity being value for money.
so w F .r o
Arising from the Government’s concern at the exorbitant prices of ever and dwelling 
houses as well as the delay in the establishment and development of residential 
townships, investigations were conducted to identify the reasons for this state of alVairs It 
was found that the variety of norms, directives and regulations applicable to the provision 
of enuineering services in such townships contribute largely to this end In order to bring
about greater uniformity in this regard and thereby facilitate the establishment and 
development of residential townships, the CSIR was requested to investigate this matter 
on behalf of the Department of Community Development and to make recommendations 
for rational norms in respect of engineering services This document provides guidelines 
for services of a high standard applicable to first world circumstances
The design of all facets of the GSP was based upon this document “Guidelines for 
the provision of engineering services in residential townships” Apart from being 
technically inappropriate in terms of levels of service adopted, the document was drawn 
up on the basis of a total design of planning and layout of a new township while Soweto 
was already populated The standards recommended in the document are appropriate for 
lower, middle and higher income groups within the sub-economic as opposed to the sub- 
economic housing market In other words it was targeted at white local authorities and 
the Provincial township boards Another item that did not receive adequate attention is 
the trade-olT between quantity and quality If less stringent specifications had been 
applied to e g kerbing and finishing on bridge piers, many more stands could have been 
serviced In fact, the project commenced construction without time being spent in 
planning the project and considering whether it was applicable and practicable
Recommendations
1 Access roads should have been designed as earth or gravel roads with only main and 
arterial roads taired
ii Stormwater drainage design along low-tratTicked access roads should be based on I in
2 year floods This would cause some inconvenience in event of such a storm but the 
capital savings compensate therefore in the form of atfordability
iii fhe primary distribution system for water should be maintained at the standard pipe 
size as this system is critical to the fighting regulations The secondary distribution 
system could have been reduced in size resulting in a slight pressure drop during peak 
times only
iv fhe reservoir capacities could have been reduced to a 36 hour or even 24 hour storage 
capacity instead of 48 hour.
v Waleiborne sewerage could have been replaced by a small solid-free system, or if this 
was still expensive, with ventilated pit latrines.
vi fhe design should have been such that a more substantial part of the works could 
have been economically achieved by labour-based construction methods
vii Alleriuitive construction materials and standards should have been considered during 
the design phase
Standard used alleriialive
I’remix
Reinforced lined channels
Chip and Spray or gravel 
Gabions / mass-concrete
('oncrete lined channels 
Stormwater pipes
Stone pitching 
Open channels
Precast elements Bridgework or locally precast 
eletnenis
Mechanical excavation Manual excavation
Appropriate Technology should be seen as synonymous with sound engineering and not a 
second class solution Before expecting clients and beneftciaries to accept alternative 
technology, the engineering profession has to embrace the concept and realise its full 
potential For any project to be economically viable, the beneficiaries must be willing and 
able to pay a reasonable charge for the services they receive This implies that provision 
of a minimum level of service for which no charge is made, with increasing charges for 
higher levels of service.
Recovery of funding should have been planned for if it was to be implemented 
spin-olTs created by the payment for services could have included:
• the community involved would have taken pride in items paid for by themselves and 
would be concerned about maintenance of these services.
• a tax-base would have been created - something Soweto was and still remains in dire 
need of a larger upgrading initiative could have been achieved if investment was 
ensured a fair of return involvement of the community in selection of service 
affordable to themselves.
Subsequently they would have been more willing to pay therefore
To iitili.se a much local labour as is rcoiioniically elTicienl 
and tccliiiically feasible
Theory
Employtnent-intensive can be defined as “the economically efficient employment of as 
great a proportioti of labour as is technically feasible produce as high a standard of 
construction as demanded by .specification and allowed by funding available" The 
advantages of labour-based projects over capital intensive projects in development 
programme are many:
community participation is inherent in the project staicture 
entrepreneurial skills are developed through e g locals becoming small cotilractors 
or fabricating precast elements
both males and females become involved 
public relations are greatly improved 
more money stays inside the community.
where land is occupied, machinery cannot access existing services to upgrade 
them whereas labour can
l abour ba.sed construction could also lead to a multitude of problems if thorough 
planning is neglected and when the project environtnent has beeti misjudged .Some pre­
requisites for successful laboitr based programmes are: 
a suITtcient labour supply
a minimum watte low enouiih to make labour based a viable altetiiative
acceptance of the community that they are getting an appropriate rather than 
inferior product
- a well documented management strategy with programmes committed to 
project success.
sufficient interest in the project for locals to become involved as contractors or 
labourers
SOWFIO
Construction of the upgrading project was purely capital intensive The project failed due 
to the lack of acceptance of the product by the beneficiaries as they were not involved at 
any stage during the project Given the time frame, it is not surprising that Labour Based 
construction was not considered The objective was not to develop skills and competence 
in Sowetans but to have a showpiece to show the world This was to be achieved in the 
shortest time possible, not providing time for careful consideration or appropriate design 
The township, the project and the attitude of the locals among others all made for a 
politically charged environment The two locals appointed to handle public relations had 
a negligible impact on informing and building good relations with the approximately I 
million strong community According to the interviews conducted with 25 members of 
Soweto they highlighted that the project was not meant to reduce the unemployment rate 
and retain most of the money within Soweto area The Soweto members alluded that the 
project was meant to serve the interest of the government but not that of the people of 
Soweto Some of the community members highlighted that some of the people employed 
to work on the project were from outside Soweto This workers came with the 
construction company from other areas where the dilTerent contractors had been working 
Capital intensive construction methods were not appropriate to the Greater 
Soweto Project A few goals were achieved eg  the services were constructed in an 
acceptable period and to a high standard, but the opportunity of improving social 
structure and developing entrepreneurial and other skills were ignored
Kei'oiiiiiieiidalions
• Conti acting is the recommended route to achieve the maximum potential benefit of 
labour-based construction I he temptation to use existing capacity and hire more 
labourers must be resisted as this excludes the development of entrepreneurs and 
mostly results in low productivity
• It is further recommended that labour should have been paid on the basis of task 
work, as this results in high productivity without space for self-exploitation
• Detailed task descriptions should have been drawn up clarifying exactly what was to 
be done, why it was necessary, the tools and equipment needed for task execution, 
how the work was to be performed and which production rates were applicable
• Where not all of the work could be defined into tasks, a percentage of the labour force 
would have been paid al a daily rate
• Coniraclor’s should have been encouraged to develop their skills by transferring 
progressively more responsibility from management to contractors
• file employer should have considered taking out an insurance policy on the works to 
cover all work done by the construction teams
• The employer could have employed eilliei a consultant or a contractor to ftmction as 
( (instruction Manager, inclusive or separate of a Materials Management function 
Control and accountahility for the materials control function should however remain 
with the constmction manager
• file Small Contractor Development Programme in Soweto has turned out being very 
successful with the added advantage of developing cohesion amongst small 
contractors Further opportunity should be afforded to the SCDP to enlarge their 
.scope and develop their skills
• Maintenance would have been simplified in that necessary .skills would have been 
developed during construction and maintenance teams appointed once a .service was 
completed
fhis would have resulted in inherent community participation, as the workforce 
was to he drawn from the local residents After project completion, the community would 
have been left with an improved social structure and multiple marketable skills 
Maintenance of tbe project would therefore be secured and economic growth had a better 
chance of developing The objective implies that the design had to be .suitable for 
employing as large as proportion of labour as possible
It was therefore imperative that the project was planned with labour based 
construction in mind from identification through design, execution and commissioning 
l abour-intensive based methods in construction were not used and it becomes clear that 
fewer people were employed by the project
1o retain a.s much of the rmancing in SOWETO as possible
The spending of large amounts of capital on the upgrading of Soweto would have 
stimulated the economy to a degree If mo.st of the spending was within Soweto the 
residents would have benefited from the stimulation of the economy Finances could have 
been kept in Soweto through use of local contractors rather than large established 
contractors According to the Soweto residents the author interviewed the project was 
capital-intensive and there were few people who were employed by the project As a 
result the project was unable to retain as much of the financing in Soweto Most of the 
money went to the contractors fhis clearly shows that a larger percentage of the money 
went out of Soweto Thus this objective was not achieved
Fo provide practicable maintenance
I henry
With any upgrading project, the ultimate objective should not be short term supply, but 
instead the assurance of sustained integrity and usability of the services in terms of 
ertective operating methods and maintenance
SOWEK)
A significant amount was paid to the environment in which the project was being carried 
out First world “move in and get out" principles were applied with no regard to the lack
of structured maintenance system Many of the services supplied are now in dire need of 
repair One of the residents claim, as to why they refuse to pay service tax 
As mentioned earlier, attention should have been paid to the following 
Lack of operating structtire which could completely maintain services after construction 
Money and time should have been spent in setting up of a structure to cope with 
administrative and technical operations and maintenance However, in order that this 
succeed, sufficient expertise need to be accumulated Where expertise are not available 
within community, residents should be trained to occupy posts In this regard, labour 
intensive construction methods should have been adopted to utilise available unemployed 
resources, the bonuses of which are plentiful - “In House” training of residents and 
keeping of moneys within the community This would have led to the community having 
a sense of pride in something towards which they had contributed, and in something 
towards which they continued to contribute.
Two schools of thought exist:
The provision of a low level of service results in a low initial capital cost on the 
assumption that incomes are presently low but with sustained economic growth, incomes 
will increase and funding will be available for frequent maintenance and upgrading of 
services The provision of first world standards of service that maintenance costs will be 
low fhis often excludes community involvement and decreases the probability that the 
community will be either willing or able to provide the initial capital cost 
fhis objective needed to be defined by the community which was to be the beneficiary on 
the one hand but had to provide the capital on the other
(b) Decisioii-iiiakiiig process and institutional ineclianisins: coniinunity 
participation
I'heory
Community participation is an active process by which a beneficiary or client group 
intluences the direction of a project with a view to enhance their well being in terms of 
income, personal growth, self reliance or other values they cherish
During the 1976 the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, the 
following was said of community participation:
('omnuinity participation should be indispensable element in Human Settlements, 
especially in planning strategies and their formulation, implementation and management, 
it should intluence all levels of government in the decision making process to further the 
political, social and economic growth of human settlements ”
I he objectives of community participation includes the following:
a) file empowerment of the community with social and political aspects - it inftuences 
the outcome of the project
b) Since the communities are involved in the decision making process, they are more 
willing to contribute to the project costs, which are controlled and retrieved more easily
c) The aftbrdability of a project can be gauged and the level of sophistication agreed 
upon depending on the aftbrdability of the community
d) file project is regarded as belonging to the community, answering to its priorities, and 
is therefore expected to be constructed, paid for and maintained by the same agency
Various levels of comnuinily participation exit The range is shown below
I ahour intensive
Capital intensive
Purist approach
Full coinniunity participation in decision making process, 
construction techniques and development of community
1 St world contract
Little attention to community participation and labour- 
intensive methods of constructions
SOWETO
The importance of community participation in the Soweto project was grossly neglected 
1 he low status given to its importance is highlighted by the following factors:
• I he report for the $l .‘'() million upgrading project was prepared and submitted in six 
weeks
• Two public relations officers were appointed to liase with the approximately 1 million 
residents
Clearly insulficient attention was given to community participation This had far 
reaching effects which are further discussed under the following sections i e appropriate 
technology, appropriate con.struction methods, finance and fiiture sustainability 
fhe community was viewed as a separate entity from the project owner or promoter 
Instead the “government" together with “unrepre,sentative” community representatives 
were viewed as the client Although the project was intended to serve the needs of the 
community, it was identified and implemented by government agencies and their 
consultants, without an effective input from the community itself This had the following 
detrimental effects on the project :
• It was not regarded as belonging to the community and therefore expected to be 
constructed, paid for and maintained by the .same agency which initiated it
• Since the community was not involved in the identification of projects, certain 
projects were chosen which were inappropriate to local needs or addressed wrong 
priorities For e g the $150-million allocated to phase I, nothing was allocated to 
the construction of recreational facilities - pools, sports field etc
• Insulficient use of local material and human resource,s, resulting in loss of 
opportunities for transferring technical and managerial expertise and channelling 
available funds into the community
Recommendalioiis
fhe following ideas should have been followed:
Community participation should have been initiated with a community organisation 
which had firm roots in .Soweto's population, which represented the various .segments of 
the population, which functioned as an open channel for the exchange of information and 
opinions between project staff and the community, and which could have served as a 
platform for community decision making These organisations could have included any 
of the following, church groups, soccer teams, political groups, teachers associations etc 
fliese are however not always easily identified If problems had been encountered in 
doing .so, then the expertise of a sociologist .should have been brought in
1
0In order to gain credibility and personal status for community representatives as 
well as to popularise participation by beneficiaries, a publicity campaign using all mass 
media should have been implemented under the guidance of specialist Surveys, aimed at 
defining the priorities of the community, their potential financial contributions etc should 
have been performed These could have been carried out by the community 
representatives A voice between the community, engineers, financiers etc should be 
maintained throughout the project cycle A body of public relations people should have 
been employed to handle this Community involvement would have contributed towards 
pride, stability, economic growth and acceptance of the project
As was mentioned the only community involvement in the GSIJP was that 3 of 
the 10 representatives serving on the Greater Soweto TPA Advisory Panel were from the 
community This means that decisions were taken on behalf of the people about what will 
be done ' to” them In other words, they were merely informed of what was going on 
without any form of consultation, let alone community empowerment being allowed
According to Mr James Crosswell, this form of autocratic decision-making which 
was general practice in the old South Africa, resulted in no commitment from the 
community, because its members were not consulted
"1x 01 i f  you leave oiil someone who believes lhal he is influenced he must he consulted" 
(Crosswell. 1995 quoted in Tn.ssler, 1997).
The role of two public relations officers is described in June 1982 report;
" Their task was to market and explain about the project to the people o f Soweto what the 
project ts all about and to investifjate and follow-up all project-related queries by the 
residents as well as problems exfierienced by contractors
Their role links up with the autocratic approach of informing, rather than consulting with 
the community The chance of success for the GSUP must have decreased as a result of 
the inadequate community liaison
Project finance
Theory
A fundamental sector of any project is that of finding funding for the project, controlling 
and monitoring it during project cycle and recovering of it thereafter The following 
issues need to be comprehensively recovered with all parties involved e g community, 
financiers etc
a How much capital is required? 
b Where will the finance be obtained from'’ 
c How will the capital be used? 
d What proportion of the capital is the be recovered? 
e How will it be recovered?
f How much is the budget for labour and project administration?
Any decision to recover any amount of the expenditure would have to be taken up 
front and conveyed to the people This would have a direct effect establishing priorities 
and community participation, since only if the community feels that it is their problem, 
and their solution answering to their priorities will they become involved in the financing 
of “their project” This was reiterated in the 1984 United Nations report on Community 
Participation: “beneficiaries are only willing to pay if they receive what they wanted, the
project would met some of the most urgent needs and priorities of the beneficiaries ” A 
successful scheme for repayment is fundamental to peoples’ perceptions and involvement 
in the project Funding can take on a number of forms:
* Grants
A government grant will originate from government coffers which in turn comes 
from the tax payer
* Repayable loans
( an come from either the government or from international batiks e g world 
bank In order to obtain such a loan, banks have increasingly demanded proof that 
their money will be safe and that loan re-payments will be met 
Most funding comprise of a combination of grants, loans and community input In 
structuring the funding of the project, the ability and willingness of the benefiting 
communities to finance the project needs to be determined
SOWKK)
During Phase I of the Soweto Project $IS() million was spent on the installation and 
upgrading of essential services in about half of the Greater Soweto area The finance for 
this project was negotiated by the Department of Foreign AITairs in 1981 with an 
overseas consortium 1 he loan was administered by Volkskas Merchant Bank (Pty) l.td 
fhe loan terms were as follows:
It was to he repaid over 20 years - interest free for the first five years, 2% in the 6th year, 
thereafter increasing by 1% per annum Even then, the loan terms were considered 
favourable The first 3 terms mentioned previously were thus clear i e amount required, 
source and how it would be spent fhe remaining 2 points (and most important long term 
issues) i e what proportion of the capital was to be recovered and how were vaguely 
considered From discussions with parties involved, it is clear that nowhere in the 
planning of the project were these issues seriously confronted Nebulous mentions weie 
made of the money being recovered from the residents of Soweto in the form of rates and 
taxes, at a later stage (Trissler, 1997)
However, over the last few years, the likehood of recovering the loan from the 
residents of Soweto has diminished The 3 community councils i e. Soweto, Diepmeadow 
and Dohsonville, which are responsible for the repayment of the loan, are doubtful that 
they will be able to service the loan, let alone repay it within the 20 years prescribed The 
reason for this, amongst internal council problems of wildcat strike and sabotage, is that 
since June 1986, most residents, often through intimidation, have boycotted the payment 
of even basic rents, thus leaving the local councils with no sources of revenue
Evaliinlioii
The spending of the money on the Soweto Upgrading Project was based on political 
ideologies and insutficient attention was paid to the recovery of expenditure fhe 
reluctance of residents to pay rates appears to arise out of a number of feelings
Firstly, since the community was not honestly represented during the planning of 
the project, no feelings of “ownership” and therefore “responsibility” are felt by their 
community
Secondly, residents are being asked to pay I6i services installed over live years 
ago Since they already have the .services, the attitude seems to be “why should we pay”
0('ompoundin(> to this due to no attention being paid to the long term upkeep of the 
services, many at e in need of maintenance
More time (definitely more than 6 weeks) and money should have been allocated 
to the involving of the community at the projects early stages (Interview with Soweto 
Councillors and Residents, 1999) The community should have felt that it was “their 
project" Under these circumstances, exact future methods of repayment of loan should 
have been finalised with the community No attention was paid to the long term 
maintenance of the services The 3 community councils should have been upgraded prior 
to the commencement of the construction of the project This would have created the 
necessary infrastnicture to maintain the services after completion
Although no major problems occurred with the controlling and monitoring in the 
financial sphere. Dr Viljoen propo.sed an effective control policy which could have 
improved on Phase I
• No authorisation for any project without a financial forecast including provisions for 
contingencies, escalation and anticipated cash flow
• Once authorised the individual project forecast should have been consolidated into a 
centralised overall budget
• ,T There should have been monthly status reports on each project reflecting progress, 
payments to date, variations against budget and updated budgets The timeous 
highlighting of potential problem areas would have enabled management to re-act 
accordingly
• There should have been well defined and clearly communicated levels of authority for 
authorising any expenditure The control should have been enforced from project 
approval down to certificated payments The amount of money involved and the 
degree of control needed might well have justified employment of internal or external 
auditors
• ( ash fiow forecasts should have been accurate and current Funds should have been 
controlled and invested to ensure maximum returns on idle money Although rates of 
intere,st are currently depressed it was incredible how interest built up on retention 
accounts during the 1984/85 period when rates were over 20% per annum
( c ) Scale of project and structure of project nnance : the project cycle
0
I he most likely reason for the project not being implemented on the same scale as 
planned can be found in the financing plan The reason for this can be explained by 
taking the traditional project cycle into account According to the DBSA and the World 
Bank the traditional project cycle consists of six phases i e identification, preparation, 
appraisal, negotiation and decision-making, implementation and post evaluation phases 
In the case of the (jSUP the first three phases were virtually skipped The project was 
identified somewhere along the line, and once the panel was formed, they actually started 
with the decision-making, and very soon thereafter with the implementation phase 
Although this had the advantage of the project delivering in a remarkably short period, it 
had major disadvantages, one being the fact that the financial appraisal was not carried 
out The World Bank definition of financial appraisal is "lo ensure that there are 
sufficient funds lo cover the costs o f implementing; the project"
In the case of the GSUP the project cycle was turned upside down, witli the scale 
of the project being determined and even implemented, before it was known whether 
sullkient funds were available. The consultants were actually allowed to continue with 
the design and documentation of the subsequent phases before financing had been 
arranged I he implication was that R23 million was wasted, as hinds were not available 
tor the construction of any phases beyond phase I Clearly this R23 million could have 
been spent on construction to the value of R20 million (allowing for professional fees of 
15%)
(tl) Project cuiindenliality
It is interesting to note that a number of the reports had been marked “confidential” 
Particularly in development projects of this nature the following questions can be raised : 
Who may not know what and why? Although reasons for the confidentiality may be 
politically motivated, it remains strange that a project aimed at improving living 
standards is not completely transparent.
Self interest
riieory
It can be expected that human beings will act in their own self interest in any situation In 
the traditional project structure, with the client, professional team and contractor often 
having contlicling objectives, the only way to handle self interest is through stringent 
contractual control When a community is the beneficiary of a project instead of the 
client, contlicts of interests are compounded and the community would be hesitant to 
accept ownership of the project
Another factor facilitating self interest is the involvement of many parties and 
individuals with objectives differing from the project objectives A vague brief creates 
the opportunity for manipulation leading to a situation where a party apart from the client 
can fulfil hidden agenda when identifying the project
In development projects the identification of a representative body is crucial to the 
project success I'hose most willing to come forward and co-operate with project planners 
at the outset are most likely to have hidden agendas and no community support Project 
management is essentially teamwork and if parties are working against each other and not 
pursuing the same goal, the project will be jeopardised
SOWKK)
fhe advisory panel consisted of statutory bodies involved in the civil engineering 
industry and particularly in contracting, consulting and research. In this period of 
recession in the industry, the Soweto Upgrading Project generated much needed work for 
all the parties concerned It is also notable that most of the consultants involved in the 
project had similar ideas/ convictions to those of the Nationalist government Van Wyk & 
l.ouw should not have been appointed as project managers as they were not in touch with 
the real objectives of the project Also, the other (' U consultants appointed for design 
woik were part of the close-knit Afrikaner - Nationalist body It is apparent that the 
needs of Soweto residents weie not top prioiity on the agenda Peihaps the most
0important hidden agenda lies in the identification of project objectives On paper the
prime objective was to upgrade the Greater Soweto Area but the implications hoped by
the government were the relaxation of sanctions and a softer attitude towards South
Africa from the rest of the world
Reroinmendations
• Vested interests should be openly acknowledged during project identification and 
planning and a concerted effort made to identify all parties with possible hidden 
agendas
• I he project brief should be free of loopholes with no room for misinterpretation of 
projects objectives
• A strategy towards elimination of vested interest in the G S Project is as follows:
1 The administrative capacities of Soweto, Dobsonville and Diepmeadow’s councils 
should have been upgraded to form a skilled authority with .sufficient manpower and 
resources at their dispo.sal to successful co-ordinate the project.
2 Market surveys should have been effected to determine the real needs and priorities 
of Ihe community before commencing with detailed planning Due regard should 
have been given to social, political and environmental needs together with 
involvement of town planners, sociologists, architects and the like
3 An independent Project Manager should have been selected to manage the G S 
Project and to report to the client consisting of Ihe 3 regional councils
4 Maintenance of the services should then have been the responsibility of Ihe client 
body who would have been equipped with the nece.ssary resources to fulfil this 
function
Project iiiiiiiageineiit 
SOWETO
file following alterations to the organisational structure would have improved efficiency
1 The client should have incorporated the community and not only local councils
2 The overall project management function should have been performed by an 
independent party acting in the best interest of the client and with no vested 
interests in Ihe project
3 Considering Ihe magnitude of the project, Ihe work should have been subdivided into 
smaller areas with a project manager in control of each subsection This would have 
facilitated communication between the various parties
('unclusiun
ll is rare for a project as a whole to be successful if the project objectives were not clearly 
defined, no comparison exists to measure project success by It is not unusual for panics 
to have widely differing opinions regarding project success depending on their level of 
involvement of their own interpretation of the objectives. Though tempting, it would be 
inaccurate to say that the Greater Soweto Civil Engineering services Upgrading Project 
was a total failure The crux of the matter lies in interpretation of objectives
1 If measured by the objective to eliminate the backlog of Civil Engineering Services in 
the (ireater Soweto area, the project was partially successful as services were constructed 
and to high standards Today an enormous backlog still exists, partly due to the lack of 
maintenance of services constructed less than a decade ago Maintenance would have 
been facilitated by the existence of an institutional framework within the Greater Soweto 
Area Instead of pursuing this goal, the project was managed from the outside in, without 
input from the project beneficiaries
2 I he pi oject was a total failure if seen as a development initiative The community was 
not involved in any decision making; communities were not encouraged to become 
sulTiciently organised to have input into the project and the community was not left with 
any new skills after project completion
3 fhe value for money achieved by tbe project could have been greatly improved if 
appropriate solutions were sought The $ 150 million could have been applied more 
elTectively, actively upgrading living conditions of the residents, if time had been set 
aside to consider alternative technology and to ascertain the communities needs Schools, 
community centres, playing fields, and recreational facilities would have had a far greater 
elVect on the people of Soweto than did the provision of more services
d It is unfortunate that labour-based construction did not even attract a passing thought 
as It was ideal for the project Not only would unemployment figures have dropped, but 
enlrepreneurial skills would have been developed leaving locals in a position to market 
themselves and secure employment
file Greater Soweto Upgrading I'roject had little credibility from conception and 
llirough construction in the eyes of the beneficiaries If vested interests had been 
eliminated by for example appointing an independent Project Manager matters would 
have improved fhe GSUP was a learning experience, engineers, planners, implementers, 
policy-makers can learn from the mistakes that were made, the authors have no doubt that 
similar projects can be successful in future.
Phase I of the GSUP is very difficult to evaluate because there is no completion 
date of the project Initially it was suppose to be completed by 1984 As to when it was 
completed there is no date provided As was indicated it can, however, not be claimed 
that the GSUP did achieved the stated objectives. The purpose of this paper was to 
emphasise the importance of a thorough project cycle, even if this might mean a lengthy 
conceptual phase, as it enhances the probability of project success significantly keceiit 
projects after 1994 have also been disappointing fhere have been no improvements from 
the mistake that have been committed by the past government fhe post 1994 piojecls 
have not been better documented The paper will then focus on the lessons implementcis 
and policy-makers should learn from the past experience as to improve project efficiency
00
A programme is successful from a technical point of view if the projects within it 
consistently result in the production of infrastructure which:
a) is desired by, and used by, the community it is meant to serve;
b) is adei|uately maintained in order to prevent deterioration,
c) meets the specified quality requirements; and
d) has affordable initial and recurrent financial costs,
e) has and high initial and recurrent socio-economic benefits
The World Bank, ILO, and independent evaluators have found that consistently 
good quality and cost-effective products have been built using highly labour-intensive 
methods in well-planned programmes Based on the historical experience of labour- 
intensive constniction programmes and projects, the pre-requisites for obtaining good 
quality products at reasonable financial cost as propagated by scholars such as 
McCutcheon, 199,‘i) the following can be recommended:
• there should be long-term political and financial commitment to the programme,
• the aims of the programme should be precise and clear,
• appropriate materials and designs for labour-inten.sive production should be identified
and developed in the planning phase of the programme (and a labour-intensive 
approach must be taken to each project from the design stage);
• appropriate contract documents and specifications should be developed;
• pilot projects should be undertaken in each sector at the beginning of the programme;
• incentive systems of payment should be used;
• long-term training programmes should be established for supervisors (whether they are 
self-employed, employed by the public sector, or employed by the private sector),
• supervisors should receive both initial and on-going on-site and off-site training,
• there should be a career structure for .supervisors (in case of small labour contractors,
a contractor development programme should be Instituted, and there .should be a 
continuous Dow of work over time for which the small contractors may tender),
• the programme should be planned such that there is continuity of work for people 
who gain .skills from the programme, otherwise skills may be rapidly lost;
• middle-level managers (or contractors) and professionals also require training in the 
successful use of labour-intensive methods,
• maintenance of the infrastructure to be produced should be planned at the design 
stage of each project;
• infrastructure should not be built if it is likely that there will be inadequate 
institutional capacity (public, private, or ‘community’ institutional capacity) or funds 
to provide the required maintenance,
• there should be community participation in each project from the conception stage 
onwards;
• monitoring and evaluation of the programme should lead to institutional changes 
aimed at improving the programme;
• in sectors which are conventionally machine-intensive, a preparation and learning 
period is required for in.stitutional development, technical development, and training 
before large-scale use of manual labour can start
In the early phases the emphasis was upon the creation of employment opportunities for 
unskilled labour Over the past decade it has become clear that in order to use labour 
productively it is necessary to train a skilled supervisor who is technically and 
organisationally competent and thus able to direct and motivate the workers under his or 
her control [it|ually, for a successful national programme it is necessary to educate 
engineers about employment creation and train them in the specific skills required in 
planning, control and evaluation of large labour-intensive programmes in time an 
experienced technician or technologist should be able to do this level of work releasing 
the engineer for engineering and planning
McCutcheon (November, 19‘X)) considers the following points as the main 
reasons for the success of the programmes in Kenya and Botswana :
• Good preliminary analytical work and thorough attention to technical aspects 
throughout the work,
• Pilot projects which tested all aspects (technical, administrative, organisational, 
institutional, wage rates and conditions of employment, training, planning, socio­
economic \ community) and acted as the embryonic training programme *'''r future 
woi k.
Strong oigamsational \ institutions w'lth good management systems: yet Ilexible, 
Irxlensive training, 
l.ong-lerm political support, 
l.ong-lerm financial support,
Good long-term co-ordination and objective external advice,
('onseirsus reached with the regard to wage rates, conditions of employment, role 
and responsibilities of the community.
I he public works programme in South Africa should change as the policy 
environment changes, from relief emergency and “special” public works programme to a 
long-term structured employment-generation programme The approach should link 
economic growth, employment and investment policies The Public Works Programme 
must aim to ensure that infrastructure is planned around local needs rather than vice- 
versa 1 he Government needs to establish a long term programme on employment 
intensive m constnjction This cannot be established overnight, and will take some years 
to fully grow into a national programme fhrough the establishment of local associations, 
poor people are able to plan improvements in their community, negotiate with local 
authorities for a greater share of investment resources and learn to organise construction and 
other projects.
Public spending on infrastructure construction and maintenance can be a valuable 
policy tool to provide economic stimulus during recessions As long as quality and cost- 
elfectiveness are not compromised, employment intensive approaches to infrastructure 
development can also be an important instrument for economic growth (World Bank, 
I9d4) when public spending on infrastructure is not wisely deployed, it can crowd out 
more productive investment in other sectors
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